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The Remains of Friendship 
and the Ethics of Misreading: 
Melville, Emerson, Thoreau
There is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. 
—Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
Is it possible, without setting off loud protests on the part of 
militants of an edifying or dogmatic humanism, to think and to 
live the gentle rigour of friendship, the law of friendship qua the 
experience of a certain ahumanity?
—Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship (1997)
In chapter 39 of The Confidence-Man (1857), the “hypothetical 
friend,” Charlie Noble, ostentatiously dismisses Frank Good-
man’s request for financial assistance: “The negotiation of a 
loan is a business transaction,” Charlie tells Frank, “and I will 
transact no business with a friend.”1 Herman Melville’s brief 
chapter proceeds to unfold the perverse logic of a philosophy of 
friendship that realizes itself most profoundly in the refusal to 
heed the friend’s cry for help. According to Melville’s fictional 
philosopher, Mark Winsome (as glossed by his fictional disciple 
Egbert), to come to the friend’s assistance is immediately to 
annul the friendship, to violate “the delicacy of the connec-
tion” (CM, 206). Beginning with Carl Van Vechten’s 1922 
study, readers have been encouraged to construe such scenes as 
proof that The Confidence-Man is Melville’s “great transcendental 
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satire” and Mark Winsome his witty and critical stand-in for 
Ralph Waldo Emerson. “Emerson’s fatuous essay on Friend-
ship,” wrote Van Vechten, “is required preparatory reading 
for this book.”2
But this approach to The Confidence-Man ought to be tem-
pered—if not significantly complicated—by Melville’s comments 
to Evert Duyckinck in March of 1849 (“Yet I think Emerson 
is more than a brilliant fellow).”3 As this letter (and any ex-
tended consideration of his work) makes clear, Melville always 
preferred the Emersonian “fool” over the many representatives 
of what he called philosophical “mediocrity”: “I love all men 
who dive,” wrote Melville. “Any fish can swim near the surface, 
but it takes a great whale to go down stairs five miles or more” 
(C, 121).4 Melville’s take on Emersonian friendship deserves to 
be reconsidered, and we might begin by reading The Confidence-
Man’s serio-comic account of friendship’s “transactions” 
alongside an apparently antithetical scene from “Bartleby, the 
Scrivener” (1853). In a moment of desperation, Melville’s 
lawyer-narrator tries to buy his way out of an unbearable re-
lationship: “‘Good-bye, Bartleby; I am going—good-bye, and 
God some way bless you; and take that,’ slipping something in 
his hand. But it dropped upon the floor, and then,—strange 
to say—I tore myself from him whom I had so longed to be 
rid of.”5 No doubt a subterranean humor always threatens to 
break through the surface of this story too, but few readers 
would be willing to write it off as satire. In fact, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that “Bartleby” may well be one of the most 
philosophically provocative stories in the American literary 
tradition. Refusing any give or take, Melville’s idiosyncratic 
friends perform (as farce or tragedy) what might be called the 
impossibilities of friendship.6 Is the friend he or she who needs 
nothing from me, who “want[s] nothing” to say to me, to use 
Bartleby’s enigmatic closing words to the lawyer (“B,” 43)? Does 
exchange ruin equality? Is friendship a relationship without 
exchange, without economy, without debt? Without even a gift? 
But what kind of friendship would that be? How could we ever 
know that such a friendship has taken place? Such questions 
might provoke anxious amusement among certain readers of 
The Confidence-Man, but they also belong to a rich discourse on 
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ethics and friendship that, I would argue, brings Melville and 
his transcendentalist contemporaries (Emerson and Thoreau) 
into dialogue with much current work at the intersection of 
literature and philosophy.7
For those who buy into Van Vechten’s account of transcen-
dental friendship, Melville’s fictional Emersonian engages in a 
“grotesque inversion of Jesus’ injunctions to lend to anyone, 
not merely ‘to them of whom ye hope to receive.’”8 But anyone 
looking to Melville for a reassuringly familiar Christian ethical 
philosophy will be hard-pressed to find it in “Bartleby.” In-
stead, the story seems to call for what Dorothy Hale has recently 
called an ethics and aesthetics of alterity.9  Seeking to reconcile 
“post-structuralist” and “humanist” invocations of a specifically 
fictional ethical demand, Hale identifies a widespread invest-
ment in fiction’s capacity to give us a “felt recognition of the 
limits of our ways of knowing.” Specifically, Hale argues, it is 
the encounter with an enigmatic and resistant character—with 
precisely one who refuses to be, in Judith Butler’s terms, so-
cially bound—that rivets the reader; if there is a uniquely ethical 
dimension to the literary experience, Hale continues, it should 
be located in a revised understanding of what Martha Nussbaum 
calls a relationship of “care.” Alterity cannot be learned but only 
“registered positively by our experience of its power to disrupt 
us,” Hale writes, “to leave us [in Butler’s words] exasperated, 
cursing, staring.”10
It is hard to hear a reference to exasperation in a discus-
sion of ethics without thinking of “Bartleby, the Scrivener” 
and Melville’s beleaguered narrator. Bartleby’s refusal to give 
ground is Melville’s great aesthetic and, I would argue, ethical 
risk. But whereas much work on ethics and literature privileges 
the reader’s encounter with fictional others,11 Melville’s story 
narrates an internal crisis of reading that refuses any hasty 
resolutions. “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” in other words, does 
not issue an ethical call so much as it represents—and thereby 
theorizes—the scene of such a call. Moreover, if there is an 
ethical element to the “friendship” between Bartleby and the 
lawyer, as I hope to show, it cannot simply be described as a 
“positive” experience gleaned from an encounter with alter-
ity. The lawyer’s “care” for the other is, in Melville’s story, 
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intimately bound up with the possibility of a violence done to 
and by its figure of alterity in the very process of their mutual 
“apprehension.” And as such, Melville’s story also asks us to 
revisit the idealizations and displacements of the philosophy 
of friendship—not, as readers of The Confidence-Man might have 
been led to suspect, in order to put a safe distance between 
Melville and the transcendentalists, but in order to push their 
“exasperating” impossibilities (notably in Emerson’s 1841 
“Friendship” and in the Wednesday section of Henry David 
Thoreau’s A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers [1849]) toward 
the edge of deconstruction.12 
“Bartleby” is haunted by Emersonian and Thoreauvian 
motifs that return in late-twentieth century philosophical in-
vocations of Bartleby’s “pure, absolute potentiality” (Giorgio 
Agamben) or of the “resistant materiality” of his famous utter-
ance (Gilles Deleuze).13 Moreover, read in the wake of the tran-
scendentalist engagement with friendship, the story reminds 
us that the distinction Hale questions between “humanist” and 
“post-structuralist” philosophy has always been internal to 
whatever we might think of as an ethical struggle. “In the final 
analysis,” writes Barbara Johnson, “it is perhaps precisely as 
an apprenticeship in the repeated and inescapable oscillation 
between humanism and deconstruction that literature works 
its most rigorous and inexhaustible seductions.”14 The story of 
Bartleby and the lawyer solicits and performs a version of this 
struggle, and it does so by asking us to consider the place of 
failed or mis-communication in the structure of relationship. 
What if failure—the failure to say what we mean, the failure to 
read the other “properly”—were not simply that which ethical 
relationship sought to purge but instead that without which no 
relationship could ever be said to have taken place? This is one 
way of thinking about the irreconcilable but inevitable oscilla-
tion between what might be thought of as a humanist investment 
in “relationship” and a poststructuralist investment in all the 
ways language refuses to deliver its letters to the right address. 
And whereas Hale’s account of the “new ethics” repeatedly 
equates the ethical with readers’ ability to “successfully occupy 
the position made for them through narrative,” “Bartleby” 
suggests that the ethical always escapes “apprehension” or suc-
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cessful realization in the scene opened up by this oscillation.15 
The disjunction between intentionality and signification, in 
other words, holds open a chance for relationship but it does 
not guarantee an ethical experience. What we call friendship, 
or ethical relation, needs to be thought, therefore, alongside 
a consideration of what, for lack of a better term, we call the 
materiality of the signifier, or the resistance to signification 
at work in every event of meaning. Does Melville’s incurably 
forlorn conjuration embody the tomblike wall of materiality 
that ruins all communication in advance? Does he, that is to 
say, figure the insistence of the signifier (there’s simply no get-
ting around Bartleby)? Or does he trouble all our attempts to 
distinguish this kind of ruination or impediment from what is 
sometimes (humanistically?) called the life of language or the 
passage of communication? Is it ethical or unethical to misread 
the materiality of the other into meaning and relation, that is 
to say, into (human) being? Under what circumstances should 
we abandon the other to his or her (it’s?) materiality? And how 
might one depart, in good conscience, from the threshold of 
undecidability that these questions define? 
zzz 
Before engaging in more detail with Melville’s story, how-
ever, I want to recall, briefly, some of the motifs and preoccu-
pations of Emerson’s and Thoreau’s transcendental philosophy 
of friendship. While they participate in many aspects of the 
classical tradition, Emerson and Thoreau distinctly push this 
philosophy toward the edge of an urgent incoherence.16 The 
friend’s enigmatic nonexistence in Emerson’s “Friendship,” for 
example, first takes the form of an absent presence, a (mere) 
structure of address: “Our intellectual and active powers in-
crease with our affection. The scholar sits down to write, and 
all his years of meditation do not furnish him with one good 
thought or happy expression; but it is necessary to write a letter 
to a friend,—and, forthwith, troops of gentle thoughts invest 
themselves, on every hand, with chosen words.”17 Emerson’s 
friend takes shape as the recipient of a letter, but one whose 
liminality almost demands that he be written into existence by 
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the letter writer. The friend exists as that which is to be an-
ticipated, like a return letter, almost to the end of time (“Let 
the soul be assured that somewhere in the universe it should 
rejoin its friend, and it would be content and cheerful alone 
for a thousand years” [“F,” 114]). In fact, Emerson will con-
clude his essay by contemplating the complete dissipation of 
this conjured other, and hence with the difficult thought of 
a non-reciprocal relation: “It has seemed to me lately more 
possible than I knew, to carry a friendship greatly, on one 
side, without due correspondence on the other. Why should 
I cumber myself with regrets that the receiver is not capa-
cious?” (“F,” 127). Friendship may be an exchange of letters 
(“To my friend I write a letter and from him I receive a letter” 
[“F,” 124]), but it may also, or even principally, consist of an 
address to the other, the friend, who may or may not reply. 
Emerson’s friend is not only the undecidably present or 
absent receiver; he is also, in one of the essay’s most memora-
ble passages, “a commended stranger” for whom “the house is 
dusted, all things fly into their places, the old coat is exchanged 
for the new” (“F,” 113–14). With this stranger, conversation is 
exalted: “We talk better than we are wont. . . . For long hours 
we can continue a series of sincere, graceful, rich communi-
cations, drawn from the oldest, secretest experience, so that 
they who sit by, of our kinsfolk and acquaintance, shall feel a 
lively surprise at our unusual powers” (“F,” 114). The friend 
in this form represents “humanity,” “what we wish” (“F,” 114). 
The friend is the good and the new; he is the embodiment 
of promise, maybe even a specifically democratic promise: 
with the friend one has a relationship to every other and to 
one like no other. 
Yet, in a heartbeat, it is all over. As soon as this stranger is 
“no stranger,” as soon as he begins to make himself known in his 
particularity (which is to be particular no longer), the moment 
has passed: “Now, when he comes, he may get the order, the 
dress and the dinner,—but the throbbing of the heart, and the 
communications of the soul, no more” (“F,” 114). Once again, 
Emerson’s friend seems to waver, coming in and out of focus 
on the threshold of the absolutely strange, and as such he seems 
to anticipate more recent attempts to account for the ethical 
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force of the literary text. “Rather than the familiar model of 
the literary work as friend and companion, sharing with the 
reader its secrets,” writes Derek Attridge, “I propose the work 
as stranger, even and perhaps especially when the reader knows 
it intimately.”18 Such formulations, virtually indistinguishable 
from what Van Vechten may have once dismissed as Emersonian 
“fatuity,” suggest that a certain kind of non-sense adheres to 
the philosophy of friendship: “O my friends,” Aristotle is said 
to have remarked, “there is no friend.”19
If we take him at his word, Henry Thoreau was someone 
who regularly irritated those around him by refusing to re-
spond, withholding what others might have considered an 
appropriate display of emotion, or withholding language 
itself (“I know that I have frequently disappointed [friends] 
by not giving them words when they expected them, or such 
as they expected”).20 Thoreau’s friendship essay, a portion 
of the Wednesday chapter of A Week on the Concord and Mer-
rimack Rivers, is itself a kind of explanation (although hardly 
apologetic) for these perceived failings: “Whenever I see my 
Friend I speak to him, but the expector, the man with the 
ears, is not he” (W, 278). In other words, my friend is not 
my friend. When I really see my friend, which may be, who 
knows, never?—in a moment?—then I will speak. Thoreau 
continues, temporarily identifying himself with his reader: 
“They will complain too that you are hard. O ye that would 
have the cocoa-nut wrong side outwards, when next I weep 
I will let you know. They ask for words and deeds, when a 
true relation is word and deed. If they know not of these 
things, how can they be informed?” (W, 278). As it turns 
out, Thoreau is resisting those merely “outward signs” of 
relation and respecting his own sovereignty as well as that 
of the friend through this distinctive and transcendental 
practice of nonrelated or silent relationship:
Each moment as we nearer drew to each,
A stern respect withheld us farther yet,
So that we seemed beyond each other’s reach,




The friend for Thoreau is an island unto himself, and to be 
more precise “some fair floating isle of palms eluding the mari-
ner in Pacific seas.” “I cannot hew the smallest chip out of the 
character of my Friend,” says Thoreau, “either to beautify or 
deform it” (W, 262, 284).
For Thoreau, friendship involves thinking relationship 
outside of the blood of kinship and in the absence of any 
institutional solidity: “There is on the earth no institution 
which Friendship has established; it is not taught by any reli-
gion, no scripture contains its maxims. It has no temple, nor 
even a solitary column” (W, 263). Thoreau’s friendship is both 
lawless (outlaw) and obedient to the “natural” and “primi-
tive” law before law. Not surprisingly, then, his philosophy of 
friendship repeatedly conjures a historical encounter between 
a white man and a Native American. “The Friendship which 
Wawatam testified for Henry the fur-trader, as described in 
the latter’s ‘Adventures,’ so almost bare and leafless, yet not 
blossomless nor fruitless, is remembered with satisfaction and 
security,” Thoreau writes. “The stern, imperturbable warrior, 
after fasting, solitude, and mortification of body, comes to 
the white man’s lodge, and affirms that he is the white brother 
whom he saw in his dream, and adopts him henceforth” (W, 
274–75).21 Such “Brothers” transcend the political and return 
us to a pre-Christian state of nature: “When the Friend comes 
out of his heathenism . . . when he forgets his mythology, and 
treats his friend like a Christian . . . then Friendship ceases 
to be Friendship” (W, 276). Thoreau’s friendship is thus both 
“ancient” and an “anticipation of the remotest future” (W, 
276); it is crucially “heathenish” and utopian, both before and 
beyond Christianity and modernity. Searching for other ways 
to describe this wordless, and ultimately impersonal, encounter, 
Thoreau suggests that the ideal friendship “purifies the air like 
electricity” (W, 275–76).
Thoreau’s invocation of electricity ought to remind us that 
there is a distinctly shocking quality to this transcendental phi-
losophy of friendship. The friendship that both Emerson and 
Thoreau attempt to put into words has the traumatizing force 
of a revolution, a new and unanticipatable event. Emerson’s 
friend-as-stranger announces the revolutionary moment, “in 
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the course of human events,” when something arrives that 
defies the logic of expectation and recognition (an event that 
happens “when . . . it becomes necessary”). If there is a radical 
dimension to Emerson’s philosophy, it is surely discernible 
here, in his philosophy of friendship. Emerson’s account of 
friendship, in other words, bears an important relationship 
to the new forms of relation announced and imagined by the 
Declaration of Independence (the latter’s “we mutually pledge 
to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor” 
is also echoed in Emerson’s reference, in a June 1840 jour-
nal entry, to “brave ties of affection not petrified by law, not 
dated or ordained by law to last for one year, for five years, or 
for life; but drawing their date like all friendship from itself 
only”).22 Friendship is what happens after all the old ties that 
bind one person (or “one people”) to another have been, to 
use the Declaration’s vocabulary, “dissolved.” In contemplating 
friendship, Emerson is distinctively contemplating democratic 
relation, but democratic relation as perpetually in the moment 
of revolution.23 
This sense of friendship as a revolutionary event is also at 
work, I would contend, in Thoreau’s figuration of friendship 
as “interruption.” In one of the most intriguing moments in 
Thoreau’s meditation, he speculates on the relationship be-
tween the sexes and friendship through the vehicle of the visit. 
He concludes, predictably we might say, that friendship is more 
likely to take place in an encounter between men. But his logic 
is not orthodox: “The visit of man to man is wont to be an 
interruption, but the sexes naturally expect one another” (W, 
271). Here, Thoreau imagines relationships between men and 
women as “natural,” which in this instance means “social” and 
conventional (the sexes naturally expect one another), while the 
interruption, the surprise, the guest whom one might not have 
the capacity to welcome, would be, for a man, another man.24 
Indeed, this conceptualization of the friend as interruption 
condenses much of the distinctiveness of the American tran-
scendental philosophy of the friend. Transcendental friend-
ship recalls not so much a particular individual or individuals, 
and certainly not an event fully present to itself, but rather 
something more akin to a disruptive (political) decision or 
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intervention. The ideal (male) friends would remain suspended 
in a state of perpetual interruption, the interruption that also 
marks the moment of sovereign autonomy, which is to say of 
sovereign decision.25
Language, we shouldn’t be surprised, flounders in the face 
of such a relationship: “The language of Friendship is not 
words,” Thoreau will write, “but meanings. It is an intelligence 
above language” (W, 273).26 And like Emerson, Thoreau tries 
to imagine an impossible relationship between sovereign be-
ings, a relationship without concession: “‘Consent only to be 
what you are. I alone will never stand in your way. This is what 
I would like,—to be as intimate with you as our spirits are inti-
mate,—respecting you as I respect my ideal. Never to profane 
one another by word or action, even by a thought. Between 
us, if necessary, let there be no acquaintance’” (W, 270). Such 
a sovereign acquaintance stands on the edge of the ludicrous 
(friendship without acquaintance) and on the edge of language. 
At this edge, language seems to have been distilled to nomen-
clature: “For the most part we stupidly confound one man 
with another,” laments Thoreau (W, 266); but the friend is he 
who can speak his friend’s name: “There are few even whom I 
should venture to call earnestly by their most proper names. A 
name pronounced is the recognition of the individual to whom 
it belongs” (W, 273). This fantasy of the proper name, of the 
most proper name, marks the site at which language would ap-
pear to operate simultaneously at its most and least arbitrary. 
In a true democracy, Thoreau implies, everyone’s name would 
be known and spoken; “everything in the political question of 
friendship,” Derrida writes, “seems to be suspended on the 
secret of a name.”27
Finally, the revolutionary aspect of transcendental friend-
ship is also apparent in Emerson and Thoreau’s invocation of a 
certain crisis of agency in the event of friendship. “Friendship,” 
writes Thoreau, “is a drama in which the parties have no part 
to act. We are all Mussulmen and fatalists in this respect” (W, 
269). “We talk of choosing our friends,” writes Emerson, “but 
friends are self-elected” (“F,” 123). “My friends have come to 
me unsought,” he continues. “The great God gave them to me. 
By oldest right, by the divine affinity of virtue with itself, I find 
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them, or rather, not I, but the Deity in me and in them derides 
and cancels the thick walls of individual character, relation, 
age, sex, circumstance, at which he usually connives, and now 
makes many one” (“F,” 115). For Emerson the “divine” names 
the supplement that would allow for relationship (and thus 
an opening to the other) without any violation of sovereign 
singularity. Anticipating Agamben’s “abyss of potentiality,” 
Emerson’s “Great God” gathers up all the violence and impos-
sibility of transcendental friendship and opens up a chance for 
what Derrida describes in Politics of Friendship under the aegis of 
a deliberately indeterminable “perhaps”:
Perhaps one day, here or there, who knows, 
something may happen between two people 
in love, who would love each other lovingly 
(is this still the right word?) in such a way that 
friendship, just once, perhaps, for the first time 
(another perhaps), once and only once, therefore 
for the first and last time (perhaps, perhaps), 
will become the correct name, the right and 
just name for that which would then have taken 
place. . . . But how can you adjust a name to 
what could take place only once, perhaps, for 
the first and last time? In other words—and in 
a much more general way this time—how can 
you name an event?28
zzz 
If the philosophical risk that Emerson and Thoreau take 
when considering friendship—the risk of never coinciding 
with a friend, of deferring friendship in the name of friend-
ship—generates a transcendental promise (friendship is that 
which is always to come), Melville’s “Bartleby, the Scrivener” 
gives an immediate, if inscrutable, face to the evanescence of 
the friend. Melville’s story, that is to say, helps us come to 
terms with the difficult Derridean concept of a friendship (or 
democracy) “to come” that is nevertheless not abandoned to 
the future. Moreover, Bartleby does not show us the face of 
an anthropomorphized abstraction (Bartleby as the incarna-
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tion of the idea of friendship) but that of an undecidable or 
threshold humanity at once waiting to be recognized as human 
and already among us, befriendable, with a name and a set of 
immediate demands.
On the face of it, of course, there is something a little per-
verse about reading “Bartleby, the Scrivener” as a contribution 
to the philosophy of friendship. It doesn’t appear to give us a 
portrait of mutuality, equality, reciprocity, or even the faint 
hope of communion between two sovereign beings. “[It] is not 
so much the story of Bartleby as it is the story of the narrator’s 
ethical relation, or failure of ethical relation, to Bartleby,” 
writes J. Hillis Miller.29 Melville’s story takes the form, Branka 
Arsić suggests, of “an apology to a friend” in which the friend-
ship always remains at a distance.30 Perhaps, then, if one were 
going to read about friendship and Melville, one ought to turn 
to Queequeg and Ishmael or Tommo and Toby? Or even Amasa 
Delano and Benito Cereno? But this would be to presume that 
we know, in advance, what friendship looks like, and one of the 
achievements of “Bartleby” is to trouble any such certainty. The 
failure of the friendship in “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” a failure 
that has variously been ascribed to the lawyer’s moral-political 
failings or the scrivener’s incurable resignation, deserves to be 
read, instead, as an inscription of that radical contingency (or, 
to recall friendship’s etymology, that freedom) without which no 
friendship could ever be said to have taken place. Melville’s 
story presents this contingency, this possibility of failure that 
is absolutely bound up with what we call the materiality of the 
signifier, not just as the sign that somewhere, elsewhere, at some 
moment in time, friendship will have taken or will take place, 
but as a constitutive factor for every event of friendship. The 
necessary possibility of performative failure not only haunts 
from outside but in fact guarantees or seals every event or ex-
perience of friendship from within. Friendship, like language, 
happens on the threshold of its incurable (constative) failure, 
and we never leave this threshold: “O my friends, there is no 
friend.” Bartleby, as Melville’s narrator tells us, comes into 
view on the lawyer’s “threshold,” and he remains identified with 
the threshold throughout the story. We can think of this as a 
threshold of performativity from out of which both the lawyer 
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and his scrivener would be called—by each other—into being 
and, simultaneously, into a relationship that never achieves 
constative certainty. 
“Friendship” enters into Melville’s story repeatedly and in 
a variety of forms. The lawyer’s initial determination to “be-
friend” Bartleby proceeds from a sense that Bartleby might be 
“useful” to him (thereby recalling one of Aristotle’s versions 
of friendship—the utilitarian friendship that falls short of the 
most virtuous) (“B,” 17). The lawyer insists on being “friendly” 
and repeatedly “entreat[s]” Bartleby “as a friend, to comply as 
far as may be with the usages of [the] office ” (“B,” 25, 26). But 
the lawyer ultimately comes up against Bartleby’s radical state of 
“friendlessness” and, despite this glimpse of incomprehensible 
isolation, is goaded into action by his “professional friends.” 
The use of the word friend intensifies at the end of the narrative, 
and by the time the grub-man at the prison in which Bartleby 
is confined asks a seemingly innocuous question, it resonates 
profoundly: “As I entered the corridor again, a broad meat-like 
man, in an apron, accosted me, and, jerking his thumb over 
his shoulder, said—‘Is that your friend?’” (“B,” 43). While the 
lawyer answers in the affirmative, it is the performative act of 
affirming, rather than the constative meaning or content (the 
affirmation), that keeps the question in play.
The question resonates because by this point in the story 
we have come to appreciate that the lawyer does not have and 
may never have had any better friend than Bartleby. He prides 
himself, as the opening of the story tells us, on being “safe”; 
he is a locked box, with or without contents or even interiority, 
who oversees the orderly transfer of wealth from one generation 
to another and, on a day-to-day basis, manages predictably idi- 
osyncratic employees. Until Bartleby. Bartleby happens to the 
lawyer like an Emersonian event or Thoreauvian interruption. 
Melville even describes his coming as an “advent,” thus recalling 
the transcendentalists’ tendency to invoke the divine when writ-
ing of the friend (as well as Derrida’s “a venir” of democracy, 
which, as Peggy Kamuf suggests in the notes to her translation 
of Specters of Marx, could be translated as “advent.”)31 For both 
Emerson and Thoreau, as we have seen, the friend is a kind of 
miracle, a gift from “God.” An advent is, of course, an arrival, 
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the coming of a radical and miraculous newness like no other; 
it announces the newness of an incarnation, a second coming, 
the world’s salvation (all on the threshold of a law office!). Yet 
it is important to remember that “advent” is simultaneously 
itself a threshold term, naming the event but also preceding the 
event, preceding the nativity, or origin; advent is anticipation 
or promise. Bartleby is a temporally disjunctive figure, the em-
bodiment of a revolutionary instant that destabilizes, undoes, 
and “unmans” the lawyer’s sovereignty: “There was something 
about Bartleby that not only strangely disarmed me, but, in a 
wonderful manner, touched and disconcerted me” (“B,” 14–15). 
“If Bartleby is a new Messiah,” writes Agamben, “he comes not, 
like Jesus, to redeem what was, but to save what was not.”32 
The lawyer initially assumes that Bartleby appears in re-
sponse to his advertised call for help: “Not only must I push 
the clerks already with me, but I must have additional help,” he 
writes. “In answer to my advertisement, a motionless young man 
one morning stood upon my office threshold, the door being 
open, for it was summer. I can see that figure now—pallidly 
neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn! It was Bartleby” 
(“B,” 11). But who is answering whom here? Who is respond-
ing to whom? Who is asking for help? Perhaps it is Bartleby 
from the very beginning who makes an enigmatic demand of 
his own; and then again, perhaps he is simply there, the door 
being open. The enigma of friendship, that is to say, is always 
already there, waiting on our doorstep. Bartleby may or may 
not arrive to answer the lawyer’s call, then, but it is crucial to 
note that the lawyer initially misreads him as if he does. He 
misrecognizes the event, and (mis)reads Bartleby into a kind 
of contractual or legal relation. This relation will gradually 
break down, however, and the lawyer will eventually come to 
experience Bartleby as a disquieting threat to his border and 
to his rights as an owner of property: “What earthly right have 
you to stay here?” the lawyer asks, fearing that Bartleby will 
outlive him and “claim possession of [his] office by right of 
his perpetual occupancy” (“B,” 33, 36). 
Bartleby announces, right from the start, a capacity to re-
place and outlast the lawyer, a capacity that is indissociable from 
his proleptically ruined presence. This would be another way 
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in which Bartleby figures the materiality of the signifier—that 
which in the signifier exceeds our intentionality, and thereby 
outlasts us, because it does not share our mortality. “Every 
letter also marks the nonoccurrence of something,” writes 
Agamben; “every letter is always in this sense a ‘dead letter.’”33 
Bartleby is ultimately “removed” to the Tombs, even as the 
well-intentioned lawyer would prefer to return him to his 
“native place” (“B,” 42, 25). This reference to a native place 
reminds us of another intriguing ghost story that writes itself 
into Melville’s tale of occupation and eviction: Bartleby also 
channels the Native American who has come to demand justice 
with his mere persistence. But who is the proper addressee for 
such a call? At once unprecedented and archaic, Bartleby, the 
returning native, out of place in his place, brings to mind the 
loaded significance of the word “friendship” in the troubled 
history of white-Native relationships in America, and his story 
begs to be compared with the utopian romance of interracial 
friendship in Thoreau.34 
Bartleby’s first act of noncompliance will replay the thresh-
old scene that the lawyer missed. And that he will miss again:
I abruptly called to Bartleby. In my haste and 
natural expectancy of instant compliance, I 
sat with my head bent over the original on my 
desk, and my right hand sideways, and some-
what nervously extended with the copy, so that, 
immediately upon emerging from his retreat, 
Bartleby might snatch it and proceed to business 
without the least delay.
In this very attitude did I sit when I called 
to him, rapidly stating what it was I wanted him 
to do—namely, to examine a small paper with 
me. Imagine my surprise, nay, my consterna-
tion, when, without moving from his privacy, 
Bartleby, in a singularly mild, firm voice, re-
plied,  “I would prefer not to.” (“B,” 13)
The lawyer initially appears to be incapable of experiencing any 
otherness; only the most minute spatial or temporal difference 
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will be tolerated on its way to being overcome “without the least 
delay.” Bartleby’s utterance functions like a claim of sover-
eignty, asserting a border in the face of one who has assumed 
his own unproblematic ability to conjoin “privacy and society” 
(“B,” 12). But Bartleby’s is a sovereignty of the threshold: he 
hesitates between absolute autonomy or independence and 
absolute insubstantiality. Indeed, his very inhumanity disarms 
the lawyer: “Had there been any thing ordinarily human about 
him, doubtless I should have violently dismissed him from the 
premises” (“B,” 13). His strange thingness (“I should have as 
soon thought of turning my pale plaster-of-paris bust of Ci-
cero out of doors” [“B,” 13]) prevents the lawyer from execut-
ing what German political philosopher Carl Schmitt claims is 
the definitive sovereign decision, namely, the decision as to 
Bartleby’s status as friend or enemy.35 The immediate illegibility 
of Bartleby, in other words, constitutes him as a Thoreauvian 
“interruption,” or Emersonian stranger or beautiful enemy; 
Bartleby has to be read, where reading begins with being (and si-
multaneously by resisting being) “disarmed” and “unmanned.” 
The lawyer, nevertheless, orchestrates his own missing of the 
event via postponement or deferral: I’ll read him later. I’m too 
busy (aren’t we all?) for the arrival of the other. 
The lawyer misses Bartleby precisely because the lawyer is 
safely enclosed within his own monadic subjecthood (the two 
seem to encounter one another like “princes” in a Lockean 
state of nature). But if the lawyer misreads Bartleby as refer-
ring to himself—as answering to his call—it would be a mistake, 
on our part, to identify this as the moment of ethical failure. 
For at the same time, the lawyer’s misreading could be said 
to usher Bartleby into subjecthood—not quite into sovereign 
subjecthood, perhaps, but rather into a more modest form of 
subjected subjecthood. How can we not call this blindness on 
the lawyer’s part an ethical act? And how can we avoid seeing 
in this misreading a formative scene for any subject? When 
thinking of how the subject becomes a subject, or how the in-
fant (without language) becomes a linguistic being (and this is 
certainly called for in the case of Bartleby, who, if not for the 
intervention of the letter, would be a Ba[. . .]by), one might 
consider various primal proto-linguistic moments: there is 
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the apparently meaningless cry that the parent responds to, 
rendering it—misconstruing it—into meaning such that the cry 
eventually and unambiguously does become a call; and then 
there is the “No” of the two-year-old that expels otherness and 
establishes a kind of sovereign being complete with ministering 
underlings (Freud’s “His Majesty the Baby” or the tyrannical 
terrible twos).36 Both moments are highly relevant to Melville’s 
story. But consider another scene: the infant says “da da” and 
the father responds, delightedly, “He is saying my name!” The 
father, in a self-serving and mildly delusionary manner, mis-
reads the meaningless sounds as meaningful words, as a name, 
a call, and this very self-serving reading could be said to have 
an ethical effect: it brings the other into relationship.
It is crucial to bear in mind that such a proto-linguistic 
moment is necessarily impossible and intersubjective: the father 
is called into being by (mis)reading the infant into subjectivity. 
But is this also a scene of violence? Speech acts are central to 
both Emerson and Thoreau’s friendship texts: writing letters 
in Emerson, silence or speaking the most proper name in 
Thoreau. And letters figure prominently in Melville (personal 
correspondence on the one hand, the letter of the law on the 
other). But Bartleby just as crucially calls our attention to the 
ur-speech act, to the proto-linguistic moment (always both an 
event and an irreducible fiction), which, as many theoretical 
accounts would remind us, is also always a form of subjection. 
“On the writing tablet of the celestial scribe,” writes Agamben, 
“the letter, the act of writing, marks the passage from potenti-
ality to actuality, the occurrence of contingency. But precisely 
for this reason, every letter also marks the nonoccurrence of 
something; every letter is always in this sense a ‘dead letter.’”37 
Bartleby figures the event of the emergence of language from 
sheer materiality, and thus the emergence of the very possibility 
of relation (“it evokes the future,” Derrida says of Bartleby’s “I 
would prefer not to,” “without either predicting or promis-
ing; it utters nothing fixed, determinable, positive, or nega-
tive”).38 At this threshold it becomes more and more difficult 
to say where violence begins and ends: “This is the intolerable 
truth that Bartleby learned in the Washington office,” writes 
Agamben, “and this is the meaning of the singular formula, 
The Thoreau family gravesite in Sleepy Hollow Cemetery, Concord, 
Massachusetts. Photo by en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Bikea. For license to 
reproduce, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/deed.en.
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‘on errands of life, those letters speed to death.’”39 But it is 
also at this threshold of meaning/nonmeaning that friendship 
takes place. 
Given what I’m referring to as the irreducible violence of 
the proto-linguistic threshold, the threshold on which Bartleby 
stands, it should perhaps not be so surprising to discover 
that the story of the lawyer’s coming to friendship is, at every 
moment, accompanied by intimations of extravagant (one 
might say Poe-esque) aggression. Much could be made of the 
lawyer’s poignant allusion to the sensational story of Colt and 
Adams, and when he wildly suggests walling Bartleby up in the 
office, how can one not recall Poe and his trail of hacked and 
secreted bodies?40 From the very beginning, the question of 
befriending Bartleby is bound up with the question of whether 
or not it will be possible to avoid doing violence to him. And 
this specter of violence seems to appear before—is perhaps 
conjured by—the wall of Bartleby’s reticence. Bartleby repeat-
edly offers a response on the threshold of nonresponse, and 
this by turns enrages and saddens the lawyer. Violence always 
appears in the story as a substitute for language or as itself a 
kind of idealized communication. Put another way, Bartleby’s 
silence, while it is often read as gesturing toward an idealized 
or transcendental invocation of perfect communication outside 
the material contamination of conventional language, comes 
across in Melville’s depiction as itself a form of aggression 
provoking acts of equivalence. Part of Melville’s achievement 
here—and a significant aspect of his distinction from Emerson 
and Thoreau—is the story’s persistent refusal to quarantine the 
idealizations of friendship from the possibility of violence. 
This aspect of the story significantly rewrites and critiques the 
classical invocation of the epitaphic moment to represent the 
achievement of ideal friendship over the friend’s grave. “You 
cannot better be employed, Bassanio / Than to live still and 
write mine epitaph,” says Shakespeare’s Antonio, an exemplary 
phallogocentric friend, in The Merchant of Venice (1.1).41 The friend 
as other self is, in the classical tradition, the perfect and per-
petual mourner, the one who mourns me even before he has 
lost me (thus, in some sense, collapsing any sense of a before): 
“I love the man so well,” Francis Bacon repeats approvingly, 
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“as I wish he may over-live me.”42 “Bartleby” participates in 
this epitaphic mode so important to the friendship tradition, 
but not without troubling it at the same time. Melville’s lawyer 
explicitly vacillates between taking Bartleby home and walling 
him up in the law office, and this vacillation, I want to insist, 
has everything to do with the ethics of misreading. 
One way of thinking about the lawyer’s vacillations and 
their relationship to misreading is to note their rehearsal in 
the voluminous secondary criticism on “Bartleby” (what Dan 
McCall refers to as the “Bartleby industry”).43 Approaches to 
the story can be provisionally divided into readings that at-
tempt to “fill in” Bartleby’s emptiness or silence (by giving 
it a name, a purpose, an intentionality or some contextual 
predetermination) and readings that seek to preserve Bartleby 
as enigma.44 Both gestures constitute acts of ethical misread-
ing: either Bartleby is to be domesticated (taken home?), his 
sovereign independence violated by interpretation, or he is 
to be preserved (archived, walled up), allowed to memorialize 
unreadability itself. Overreading—which is to say almost any 
reading—is always in danger of ruining what McCall describes 
as “the profound emotional experience of realizing Bartleby 
as Bartleby.”45 But it is precisely the problem of misreading 
Bartleby by naming his emptiness that my discussion of ethi-
cal misreading wishes to draw attention to. Because not only 
is it impossible to speak about Bartleby without beginning to 
fill him in, without bringing into focus what Derrida calls the 
“silhouette of a content that haunts [his] response,”46 but there 
is also nothing assuredly “ethical” about abandoning him to his 
inscrutability. “The whole point of Bartleby, the maddening 
and precious thing about him,” writes McCall, “is that he is a 
lost cause. He is inconsolable.”47 This seems hard to dispute. 
And, yet, why does McCall call this inconsolable figure “mad-
dening” and “precious” if not to indicate that his lost cause 
won’t leave us alone? Our interpretive crisis, indeed, paral-
lels Melville’s literary achievement: What is so priceless about 
Bartleby is his uncanny capacity to signify empty materiality and 
overwhelming pathos at one and the same time, in one and the 
same persona. We are prevented at every turn from narrating 
this incredible simultaneity away. 
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Faced with the enigmatic message that is Bartleby, the lawyer 
doesn’t simply give up on the promise of meaningful speech—he 
won’t give up on the promise of human being. But this is not 
simply to praise the lawyer, to locate him on the right side of 
an ethical divide. For we know that questions about the eth-
ics of insisting on life, of prolonging life where it is not clear 
there is any desire to live, are among the most intractable of 
contemporary “ethical” dilemmas. There can be a violence, 
and a self-preserving violence at that, in refusing to give up on 
the other’s humanity. Melville’s lawyer insists, quite peculiarly, 
that Bartleby is an honest man, and he struggles to contextual-
ize Bartleby, even if in doing so he is also attempting to get rid 
of him, to find his origin and send him back home where he 
belongs: return to sender. For the lawyer’s refusal to give up 
on Bartleby is also stubbornly self-serving: he reads Bartleby 
because he doesn’t know what else to do—as if his life, his own 
crumbling borders, depended on it. 
It should by now be apparent that in Emerson’s and Tho-
reau’s invocations of the non-corresponding friend, the friend 
who never arrives, or the silent friend, Bartleby was already 
present. This would be one way of accounting for the fact, not 
only that Emerson’s and Thoreau’s texts produce figurations 
that seem to conjure Bartleby, but that both men were de-
scribed, at various times, in Bartleby-like terms.48 But where in 
the transcendental account the absence or silence could always 
be read as the mark of promise—a space to be filled, one day, 
somewhere—in Melville’s Bartleby, the silence isn’t the silence 
of anticipation. Put another way, after Bartleby we would have 
to appreciate that Thoreau and Emerson were always already 
describing friendship—not friendship to come, not failed 
friendship or inadequate friendship, but the very structure 
of friendship as necessary misreading. The transcendental-
ist friend theorizes an ethical misreading that makes of every 
subjectivity a missed communication, a misdirected, lost, and 
illegitimately opened letter. I’m thinking here, of course, of 
Melville’s epilogue to “Bartleby,” which poses as an origin or 
explanation, a harbor or home, yet insists once again upon 
remains, mere traces of relation, dead letters, or a veritable 
sea of failed acts of address. The lawyer offers us the epilogue 
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as a tentative frame (it ends the story but is promised at the 
outset—the events it narrates took place some time ago, yet they 
function as a conclusion). But, in fact, what we experience is 
repetition: the dead-letter story returns only to give us the 
story of Bartleby and the story “Bartleby” again and again. And 
with this epilogue, Melville (not unlike Emerson and Thoreau) 
tells the story of the opening to friendship as an autoeconomy 
of loss: the lawyer comes into relation by mourning his own 
refusal to relate. Read through “Bartleby,” this, then, would 
be the transcendental innovation: friendship mourns—even 
as it ethically misreads—our own (and the other’s) resistance 
to relationship. 
This way of thinking about friendship gives us a new way of 
reading the long investment in the epitaphic mode of classical 
friendship. Consummating friendship in the graveside speech 
would be another way of trying to register, while disavow-
ing, the violence of relation—the violence which insures that 
every friendship proceeds by mourning the loss of sovereign 
friendlessness, sovereign resistance to legibility. Such sovereign 
resistance (itself an inscription of the materiality of the signi-
fier) can, as we’ve read in Emerson and Thoreau, generate a 
discourse of friendship as perpetual promise, of the perfect 
reading to come. But the notion of an ethical misreading, the 
proposition that materiality can be—and must be—misread 
into subjectivity, resists this temporalization or deferral of 
friendship; ethical misreading undoes in advance the simple 
opposition of success and failure (felicity or infelicity, to use 
the language of speech-act theory) in the event of friendship. 
This deconstructed friendship can be read out of the tran-
scendentalists’ invocations of the impossible or the divine, but 
such invocations have had less hold on our imagination than 
has the faceless face of Melville’s Bartleby. Bartleby, unlike the 
transcendentalist friend, does not wait on any horizon; he is 
not a fair floating isle; he is not divine. Melville insists that we 
see him now (“I can see that figure now” [“B,” 11]). Bartleby 
is there on the threshold; and although he is “not particular,” 
he is also, uncannily, the only character in the story who has a 
proper name—as well as, of course, an unforgettable refrain. 
Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” courteously and peril-
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ously posits his being on the edge of a negative utterance. For 
Gilles Deleuze, Bartleby’s “mad,” “agrammatical” signature 
phrase “ravages” language in both its constative and perfor-
mative dimensions, “carv[ing] out a kind of foreign language 
within language, to make the whole confront silence, make it 
topple into silence.”49 But Deleuze also insists that this ruinous 
or paradoxically passive attack is not without its radical demo-
cratic promise.50 The phrase leaves Bartleby on the threshold of 
meaning/non-meaning and being/non-being precisely because 
his “No” isn’t the forceful “No” of a founding. “I would prefer 
not to” functions as the undoing of “I do,” the words one says 
if one is prepared to cross, or be taken across, a threshold, 
and they mark the scrivener as one who doesn’t consent, who 
doesn’t sign the social contract. Bartleby is the quasi-subject 
who refuses to enter into almost any exchange—he doesn’t eat, 
he hordes his money, he barely speaks. But at the same time his 
phrase appears to position him as a radical Thoreauvian and 
Emersonian subject of contract, one who assumes the right 
to offer or withhold his consent in each and every particular 
instance. Bartleby’s utterance is thus also the negative rewriting 
of Emerson’s famous “whim” (“I would write on the lintels of 
the door-post, Whim”),51 a suggestion hinted at in one of the 
story’s internal “readings” of Bartleby: “It may only be a passing 
whim,” says Nippers of Bartleby’s peculiar conduct (“B,” 18). As 
such, Bartleby’s utterance would constitute a speech act that may 
or may not come to mean later (“I hope it is somewhat better 
than whim at last,” Emerson continues, referring to the self’s 
enigmatic acts and utterances, “but we cannot spend the day in 
explanation”).52 The phrase functions as a signifier of (sheer) 
repetition, becoming less constative and more performative as 
it repeats and empties itself of meaning, but it nevertheless takes 
on a certain force, infecting the speech of others: “Somehow, 
of late, I had got into the way of involuntarily using the word 
‘prefer’ upon all sorts of not exactly suitable occasions” (“B,” 
27). Indeed, Bartleby himself seems to insist on the materiality 
of his signifier: “You will not?” asks the lawyer, begging for some 
deviation from the same; “I prefer not,” Bartleby replies (“B,” 
19). With Bartleby we are reminded that the best and worst way 
to say anything is simply to say it again. 
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The lawyer struggles to read Bartleby’s maddeningly repeti-
tive and thus strangely provocative words, then, but he also has 
to read Bartleby’s silence. For not only will Bartleby not be 
bound by “common usage” or “common sense” (“B,” 15); he 
won’t even be bound by the minimal conventions of the speech 
situation, the implicit contract or “promise framework,” in 
Derrida’s terms, whereby one party speaks and the other replies. 
“Whenever I address the other, when I say to the other ‘I’m 
talking to you,’ I’m already in a promise framework,” writes 
Derrida; “I’m speaking to you means, ‘I promise to continue, 
to go to the end of the sentence; I promise to tell you the truth, 
even if I lie.’”53 “Will you not speak? Answer!” shouts the law-
yer (“B,” 15). Bartleby repeatedly says nothing (“He answered 
nothing” [“B,” 33]; “He answered not a word” [“B,” 30]; “He 
made no reply and nothing more was said” [“B,” 37]). One 
must read, and I am tempted to say listen, very carefully in this 
struggle to hear the difference between saying “no” and say-
ing nothing. No answer can always be an answer, even a range 
of answers, or it can be nothing at all. It can always be sheer 
mechanical/material repetition. But this in turn repeats the 
problematic of Bartleby’s very existence: is he addressed, does 
he address, or does he merely repeat, persist, remain? In other 
words, if Bartleby’s utterance approaches unreadability, this is 
because Bartleby himself is also always confronting us as a piece 
of nonsignifying traumatic materiality. Bartleby, the bearer of 
the name (the story’s only name), is also the site of the always 
possible impossibility of the event of naming, of successful 
address, of letters arriving at their destination. 
Instead of the utopian heights of friendship familiar to us 
from the classical tradition (“There is, beyond all my reasoning, 
and beyond all that I can specifically say,” writes Montaigne of 
his perfect friend, “some inexplicable power of destiny that 
brought about our union”),54 Melville offers us the merest 
trace of a meaningful exchange. All the lawyer ever wants to 
do, one might say, is to speak with Bartleby and yet it is not 
clear that this ever happens. Facing the prison wall, though ap-
parently addressing the lawyer, Bartleby utters his last words: 
“I know you . . . and I want nothing to say to you” (“B,” 43). 
There could hardly be a stronger rebuke: I recognize you and 
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I don’t want to speak to you; to you in particular I say, “no.” 
The lawyer, who will finally go to the prison and beg to have an 
“interview” with the “silent man,” holds on to a relation with 
Bartleby only by misreading or overreading him (“B,” 43). His 
most marked mistake has been to assume that even if Bartleby 
does not address him, Bartleby is addressed to him. But here, 
too, Bartleby proves him wrong. He is, to the end, (almost) 
completely indifferent, (almost) completely impersonal even 
as (and the lawyer’s own language suggests this) he can come 
to stand in for everyone: When the lawyer abandons his Wall 
Street Office out of frustration, Bartleby stays behind, and 
the new occupant, another lawyer, calls on the narrator to take 
responsibility for the vagrant. “In vain I persisted,” writes the 
lawyer, “that Bartleby was nothing to me—no more than to any 
one else” (“B,” 39). The lawyer’s words here seem to anticipate 
Bartleby’s final remark: “I want nothing to say to you.” But 
this repetition alerts us to an excruciating ambiguity: Bartleby 
“wants nothing” because he lacks nothing in his relationship to 
the lawyer: he is all address, his address is meaningful. And the 
lawyer, in turn, is refused the place of nonresponsibility that 
he so desperately seeks. “I want nothing to say to you” also says: 
there is no safe zone of non-relation with Bartleby. 
Despite the failure of relationship in “Bartleby, the 
Scrivener,” the final scenes in the prison recreate, however 
minimally, however implausibly, a relationship to an ideal-
ized pastoral friendship tradition: the grass insists on growing 
within this tomb (“by some strange magic, through the clefts, 
grass-seed, dropped by birds, had sprung” [“B,” 45]), and the 
lawyer tries to strike up a conversation by doing what we all do 
everyday: talking about the weather (“Look, there is the sky, and 
here is the grass” [“B,” 43]).55 Refusing the sovereign materiality 
of the traumatic signifier, the lawyer desperately offers Bartleby 
a tutorial on the sign, on reference: here is language; this is how 
we communicate. Melville’s powerfully disjunctive version of the 
American pastoral scene of male-male (or white-Native) friend-
ship, once again calls to mind Thoreau: “The Friend,” Thoreau 
writes, “is a necessarius, and meets his Friend on homely ground; 
not on carpets and cushions, but on the ground and on rocks 
they will sit, obeying the natural and primitive laws” (W, 274).
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As an interruption in the classical discourse, “Bartleby” 
reminds us that friendship has repeatedly been invoked to veil 
or deny the self’s perilous relationship to both meaning and 
being, even at the expense of one’s own life: my friend is he 
who could adequately write my epitaph, put me into words that 
will last and belie my merely mortal being; my friend as other-
self shores up my narcissism or sovereignty. But to expose this 
aspect of the friendship tradition is not to call for an ethics of 
free relations between subjects uncorrupted by the symptom-
atic “friendship” of narcissistic indulgence. It is not to call, 
in increasingly familiar terms, for a cleansing “reciprocity” or 
“mutuality.” Rather it is, among other things, to reconsider 
narcissism. My friend is indeed narcissistically indispensable, 
for my friend is the one for whom my utterances are mean-
ingful. My friend is he who helps me to live out the fiction of 
my own being. In Bartleby, Melville’s lawyer repeatedly con-
fronts a marginal being who reveals rather than conceals the 
lawyer’s own tenuous hold on existence. In refusing the terms 
of friendship, even when there is nothing else left, Bartleby 
exposes the fantasy of sovereign being and meaningful speech. 
This cadaverous copyist, who maybe only looks like a man the 
way certain marks are sometimes said only to look like signs, 
“calls friendship back to non-reciprocity, to dissymmetry or 
to disproportion, to the impossibility of a return to offered or 
received hospitality; in short . . . to the irreducible precedence 
of the other.”56 But “Bartleby, the Scrivener” also suggests that 
friendship happens, if it does, where sovereignty collapses, 
which is also to say, where language confronts its constitutive 
edge of incoherence. Every event of friendship, by definition, 
would have to contain, as if walled up in its very structure, this 
figure for the failure to communicate, for sovereign irrespon-
sibility and for the resistance to being.
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